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Abstract
In their attempt to connect the workings of the human mind with their neural realizers,
cognitive neuroscientists often bracket out individual differences to build a single,
abstract model that purportedly represents (almost) every human being’s brain. In this
paper I first examine the rationale behind this model, which I call ‘Platonic Brain
Model’. Then I argue that it is to be surpassed in favor of multiple models allowing
for patterned inter-individual differences. I introduce the debate on legitimate (and
illegitimate) ways of mapping neural structures and cognitive functions, endorsing
a view according to which function-structure mapping is context-sensitive. Building
on the discussion of the ongoing debate on the function(s) of the so-called Fusiform
“Face” Area, I show the necessity of indexing function-structure mappings to some
populations of subjects, clustered on the basis of factors such as their expertise in a
given domain.
Keywords Neuroscience · Cognitive ontology · Individual differences · Functional
specialization · Fusiform face area · Contextualism
1 Cognitive neuroscience and the Platonic Brain
Cognitive neuroscience handbooks often contain sentences such as: “Cognitive neuro-
scientists attempt to understand the relationship between the brain and mind” (Banich
and Compton 2018: p. 3). Other handbooks recount “how mental processes such as
thoughts, memories and perceptions are organized and implemented by the brain” (J.
Ward 2015: p. 1) and introduce the methods to investigate such processes. An early
step in many neuroscientific enterprises is functional localization: the ascription of
a psychological label to some neural structure based on its purported involvement
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in some behavioral task. In most cases, functional ascriptions are a matter of sharp
contention. However, a few functional ascriptions are taken as received wisdom.
Take the striate cortex, also known as V1. Indeed, almost everybody agrees that
V1 is in the business of processing visual information—hence its alias primary visual
cortex. This is unsurprising, given that V1 receives afferents fibers from the geniculate
nucleus, which in turn receives fibers from the retina. It would thus be safe to say that
V1 deals with visual information in most cases.
But what functional role does this primary visual cortex play in blind subjects?
Since they do not process any visual information, were brain areas rigidly ‘tied’ to
their functional destiny, we would expect that V1 simply does nothing. However, this
seems not to be the case. In fact, fMRI scans reveal activity in blind subjects’ V1
(and in other cortices) when they read Braille; and impairment in their performance
may be obtained by perturbing V1 via transcranial stimulation (Kupers et al. 2007).
A growing number of such cases suggest that several ‘visual’ areas are way too busy
in non-sighted subjects to be actually and uniquely visual.
To account for such findings, some scholars have been ready to retract the ascrip-
tion of visual functionality to V1. Notably, according to the meta-modal hypothesis
(Hamilton and Pascual-Leone 2001),1 V1 and other purportedly ‘visual’ cortices still
perform the same computation, e.g. shape recognition, across variousmodalities. Hav-
ingdescribed striking similarities in the neural activity of the ‘visual’ cortices of sighted
and congenitally blind subjects on several circumstances, Ricciardi and Pietrini (2011)
argue for a more abstract characterization of the function of these structures.
However, this ‘digging deeper’ strategy (which I shall examinemore closely in §3.2
under the term “functional abstraction”) may sometimes be unsatisfactory. In fact, in
blind (as opposed to non-blind) individuals, several “visual cortices” activate during
tasks such as listening to a spoken language or doing math equations, which are hardly
accountable in terms of “shape recognition” (Bedny 2017).
The storymight get evenmore complex—and intriguing. As bizarre as it may seem,
some congenitally blind individuals devise an ingenious strategy to compensate for
the lack of visual input when navigating space: echolocation. They repeatedly make a
click soundwith their tongue and use the echo to identify obstacles and other objects in
their surroundings (Downey 2016). Notably, fMRI reveals that echolocation activates
areas in the vicinity of V1 (Thaler et al. 2011).
Now, undoubtedly several metamodal labels can be devised to account for the
activity of some visual areas in tasks such as reading Braille or echolocating. Yet, by
dismissing the differences between such tasks, these labels are likely tomiss something
quite important: namely, that this very area is involved in doing something different in
the two cases. However, it is worth stressing that the area’s engagement in visual pro-
cessing simply cannot occur in blind subjects; nor can its engagement in echolocation
occur in sighted subjects.
This simplified story was meant to emphasize that brains and cognitive abilities
exhibit important differences across human beings. This is a well-known fact, of
course. Yet, as it often happens to facts when they are too well-known, I contend that
its implications have received less attention than they deserve. Recall the quotes from
1 Sometimes also called supramodal hypothesis.
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the handbook that open of this section: the task they set for cognitive neuroscience is
to “understand the relationship between the brain and mind” (Banich and Compton
2018: p. 3. Italics mine); to unravel “how mental processes […] are organized and
implemented by the brain” (J. Ward: 1. Italics mine)—as if one “Platonic” model of
the brain might explain everything we need to know about the functional organization
of every actual (and possible) human brains.
In this paper, I have three aims. First, I aim to explain the rationale behind the “Pla-
tonic Brain Model” that treats individual differences in brain functional organization
as noise to be zeroed out (§2). Second, I highlight some of its limitations. To do so, I
provide an upshot of the extant philosophical literature on (the difficulty of) mapping
cognitive functions onto neural structures (§3), and present a case study in which a
Platonic Brain Model falls short of accounting for all the relevant function-structure
mappings, namely the case of the Fusiform ‘Face’ Area (§4). Third and last, I discuss
the virtue of, and begin to sketch a recipe for, a post-platonic neuroscience, in which
the function-structure mappings are indexed to certain populations of subjects, e.g.
subjects who share a certain degree of expertise in some domain (§5).
2 Dealing with individual differences: the Platonic Brain Model
Individual differences in human brains are particularly evident when we consider
extreme pathological cases like those hydrocephalic subjects2 who exhibit no sign
of mental impairment (Nahm et al. 2017), or when we compare children and adults’
brains (e.g.Wilke, Schmithorst andHolland2003).However, aidedby the development
of tools such as Voxel-Based Morphometry (Whitwell 2009), neuroscientists have
become growingly interested in investigating differences even outside the clinical or
the developmental domain. In a now classic study, Taxi drivers in London were shown
to exhibit a peculiar increase and decrease in volume in the posterior and anterior
hippocampus, respectively, which correlates with the amount of time spent driving
taxi (Maguire et al. 2000). Hippocampus’ thickness also seems positively correlated
with the socioeconomic status, like many other cortical and subcortical structures
(Farah 2017).
But individual differences are not limited to anatomy. Instead, they extend to phys-
iology, altering the functional landscape of brain organization, sometimes profoundly.
As people get older, the same tasks that used to elicit a right-lateralized activity of the
prefrontal cortex tend to bring about a more bilateral activation. In other tasks, aging
correlates with increased activity in the anterior regions, and diminished activity in
posterior regions, even when performance rests unaltered (see De Brigard 2017 and
the references therein). In people who played Pokémon videogames in their youth, as
opposed to those who did not, looking at Pokémon consistently activates a portion of
the occipitotemporal sulcus whose localization is consistent among subjects (Gomez
et al. 2019). Similarly, merely looking at this very sentence (or at any string of letter)
should suffice to engage a part of the left ventrotemporal cortex in literate subject-




s—hence its alias visual word form area. But the same activity would not show up in
illiterate subjects (Dehaene et al. 2010).
On the one hand, psychological science never ignored individual differences.
Indeed, according to Danziger (Danziger 1990/1994), investigating individual dif-
ferences was precisely the core business (sometimes literally!) of one of the most
prominent tradition during the early decades of scientific psychology, namely the Gal-
tonian tradition (after Francis Galton). Setting the stage for modern psychometrics,
they studied the relationships between indicators of different nature—sociological,
anatomical, and psychological (e.g. performance in tests)—in individual subjects and
groups (sometimes yielding to questionable conclusions). However, throughout the
history of scientific psychology, and later also in the history of neuroscience, individ-
ual differences were mainly conceived quantitatively. That is, the difference between
subjects is represented by scoring differently on several scales, e.g., IQ scores, the
Big Five personality traits, the volume of some brain areas such as the posterior hip-
pocampus.
Far less attention has been paid to qualitative differences in cognitive skillset or
brain organization.Most studies in cognitive neuroscience are taken to be generalizable
foralmost every humanbrain.When they are toodissimilar from the average, “outliers”
are treated as exceptions or noise, whose explanation is left to clinicians.
A rationale for this framework can be found in a well-known methodological paper
by Caramazza (1986). Before the rise of neuroimaging techniques that allow studying
the human brain in vivo, lesion studies were the bread and butter of mind and brain
sciences. Cognitive neuropsychologists studied the cognitive impairments of patients
who suffered a focal brain lesion not merely for the sake of understanding a clinical
case, but also to unravel the workings of healthy brains.
As a neuropsychologist, Caramazza reflects upon the inferences that can be drawn
from impaired to unimpaired cognitive systems, making the underlying assumptions
explicit. He states that
A crucial feature of [any model of human mind/brain] is the assumption of univer-
sality; that is, the assumption that [themodel] is true of “normal” humanmind/brains in
general and, therefore, of any individual normal mind/brain (Caramazza 1986: p. 49).
Caramazza clearly does not ignore individual differences. Instead, he seeks them
as something to rule out for the sake of generality, claiming that “we are going to have
to place some restrictions on what will count as ‘normal human mind/brain’” (ibid.).
He goes as far as to claim that “if we were not to accept the assumption of universality,
we would negate the possibility of scientifically investigating the mind/brain” (ibid.).
Crucially, the assumption of universality is the cornerstone of the single-patient
method, for it justifies a generalization of the model (however falsifiable) based on
evidence gathered from a single-patient and then extended to every “normal” subject.
For Caramazza, the single-patient method is superior to the group-method, given that
the latter may engender a spurious clustering of patients based on syndromes rather
than on etiology.3 Indeed, what might prima facie appear as the same impairment
3 Although an extensive comparison of single-case versus group-case methodology is beyond the scope
of this paper, for the present discussion it is worth noting that a major matter of contention concerns the
selection of a methodology that would avoid the confounds of idiosyncratic performances. For a focus on
the controversy see Shallice (1988: ch. 9–10; 2015); Bartolomeo and colleagues (2017).
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due to common symptoms might be caused by lesions in different sites, and these
important differences are easily overlooked when averaging across patients.
However, Caramazza clearly stresses that the universality assumption also holds
for group studies:
The justification for using the performance of groups of subjects in our experimental
investigations is based on the assumption that the averaged performance of the group
essentially reflects the performance of any individual in the reference population from
which the group was drawn. Thus, any conclusions arrived at for the group of subjects
tested will be assumed to be true of all individuals in the reference population. This
argument is only valid if the assumption of universality is true (Caramazza 1986:
p. 50).
Let us now make a twenty-years leap forward in time. The rise of hemodynamic
neuroimaging techniques has reshaped the scientific landscape. Lesion studies are no
longer the favorite tool of cognitive neuroscientists (that is how they get called now),
as researchers can now glimpse at brain activity in vivo in healthy subjects. As these
subjects are healthy, the syndrome-etiology worry that concerned Caramazza ceases
to apply. However, the universality assumption is still there, albeit in a new guise.
At the end of a lengthy discussion aimed at formalizing and justifying the infer-
ences drawn from neuroimaging data to function-structure mappings, Henson (2005)
addresses the possible objection according to which “different developmental trajecto-
ries (based, for example, on the order of exposure to different stimuli, such as language)
may result in different ‘final’ function–structure mappings” (Henson 2005: p. 224).
His reply reads as follows:
the only solution is the nomothetic solution: to define “normal” psychological
functions—in the healthy adult, for example—and to assume that there is [a] sin-
gle “normal” mapping of these functions to the brain. This then becomes an empirical
question: if the function–structure mapping changed […] so dramatically as a function
of different developmental trajectories, one would not observe reliable differences in
imaging data when averaging over random samples of normal individuals. The fact
that neuroimaging can produce reliable and reproducible differences suggests that
there is a normal (default) function–structure mapping. (Henson 2005: pp. 224–225).
Researchers working under such an assumption thus look at individual differences
as a possible threat to generalizability. Two strategies are employed for ensuring gen-
eralization: (a) adopting some screen-off criteria to exclude “abnormal subjects”, and
(b) establishing the perimeter of normal results by averaging among data gathered
from normal subjects.
Screen-off the abnormal—Usually, the “participants” section of neuroscientific arti-
cles reassures the reader that screen-off criteria have been respected. Typically, the
description of participants boils down to a few details, e.g. whether they are healthy,
adults, right-handed, and normal-sighted (to be able to see the stimuli in the scanner).
As long as they are respected, the researchers go on describing the findings as if they
pertain to a Platonic Brain, suggesting the reader that they generalize to virtually any
human being—unless she fails to meet the screen-off criteria.
Averaging—Even after the ‘abnormal’ brains are screened off, normal brains do
comewith different sizes, shapes, and several other idiosyncratic features. Researchers
have come upwith several different techniques for aggregating data frommultiple sub-
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jects. A common strategy, that Zina Ward (2019) dubbed the cartographic approach,
consists in plotting activations frommultiple subjects’ brain onto a common reference
space or template. But other approaches exist, that employ functional criteria together
with anatomical ones to align brain activations of multiple subjects (cf. fn. 10).
Working under the assumption of the Platonic Brain Model was not unreasonable.
After all, brain development is often based on somewhat similar genetic blueprints,
and many experiences are similar enough for the whole humankind to result in the
same brain organization.4 This theoretical bet has proven fruitful not only for phyloge-
netically oldmental activities, but also for relatively recent ones: in fact, the location of
the visual word form area is stable across subjects (Dehaene et al. 2010; see Rathkopf
(forthcoming) for a discussion of some implications).
Nevertheless, working under the assumption of a Platonic Brain Model comes with
some theoretical costs and risks. For instance, Zina Ward (2019) shows how, when
different brains are aligned with respect with some features (e.g. microanatomical
properties) in neuroimaging studies, this may result in misalignment in other fea-
tures (e.g. functional properties), and concludes that the choice of aligning technique
depends upon the question one has inmind—i.e. there is no one-size-fits-all techniques
to align brains.
Since the topic has many more implications that one can account for with a single
paper, I will restrict my discussion to a specific topic. Like many neuroscientific
endeavors start by hypothesizing a simple function-structure mapping (Bechtel and
Richardson 2010), the following discussion will scrutinize Henson’s claim that “there
is a normal (default) function–structure mapping”.
3 Mapping cognitive functions onto neural structures
3.1 The quest for functional specialization
The question of whether the cortex is equipotential (i.e., its parts are functionally
interchangeable) or functionally specialized (i.e., each part plays a specific function)
dates back at least to the nineteenth century (Mundale 2002). Since then, scientists
have been oscillating between the two positions. The longevity of the debate suggests
that empirical data do not speak for themselves: they can be interpreted differently
to defend one viewpoint or the other. The advocates of the functional specialization
hypothesis have strenuously defended the following claim:
Functional Specialization [FS]: for each neural structure s, there is one functional
description f, so that the process f occurs if and only if s activates.
4 To what extent the whole mankind shares similar experience is matter of controversy. Indeed, in a now
classical paper, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan (2010) lament that most psychological studies, while
making universal claims, are uniquely based on WEIRD subjects (Western, Educated, from Industrialized,
Rich and Democratic countries). In response, a new wave of cross-cultural research in cognitive science




Fig. 1 Functional Specialization [FS] entails that the relationship betweenmental functions f and (the activity
of some) neural structures s will result in a set of biconditionals sx ↔ f y. Counterevidence can affect both
directions: when a structure underpins several functions (multifunctionality), it contradicts the statement
that sx → f y,. When a function is conjunctively (distributed processing) or disjunctively (degeneracy)
realized by several structures or set of structures, it contradicts fy → sx
Prima facie, FS is wiped out by current evidence: the literature reports several cases
in which one or the other side of the biconditional fails to obtain. Such cases may be
sorted into two major classes: cases of many-to-one function-structure relationships
(a)5; and cases of one-to-many function-structure relationships—which come in two
versions (b, c) (for a schematic recap, see Fig. 1). Let us briefly examine these cases
in turn:
(a) Multifunctionality: one neural structure implements multiple functions.
Multifunctionality seems to be a ubiquitous property of brain structures, albeit some
have more functions than others (Anderson and Pessoa 2011).6 A few examples: the
insula seems to be involved in a variety of functions, ranging from sensorimotor control
to the experience of disgust and its perception in others, to the processing of salience
for novel stimuli (Uddin et al. 2017). Broca’s area, once thought to be eminently
involved in language production and/or in syntactic processing, has been reported to
activate also during motor planning and music processing (Tettamanti and Weniger
2006). Left posterior lateral fusiform, corresponding to the abovementioned visual
word form area, also seems to be involved in the interpretation of visual attributes of
animals, as well as in tactile-visual interface (Price and Friston 2005).
(b) Distributed processing: one cognitive function relies upon the coordinated
work of multiple brain structures.
No brain region operates in isolation from others: instead, each cognitive task seems
to elicit the orchestrated activity of a coalition of neural regions. This principle has
5 The expectation that each neural structure would have one cognitive function might also fail because
some structures have functions that are non-cognitive in nature. Haueis (2018) has vindicated the existence
and relevance of non-cognitive functions whose job is to maintain and protect the nervous system rather
than processing behaviorally relevant information.
6 Recognizing the pervasive multifunctionality of most brain structures famously led Poldrack (2006) to
warn against the misuse of reverse inference, i.e. inferring that a cognitive process is ongoing because of
the activation of a neural area traditionally associated to it. However, it is useful to point out that at least
three distinct kinds of mechanistic organizations lurk beneath the (alleged or real) multifunctionality of
biological structures (McCaffrey 2015; cf. later in the main text).
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been discussed at length in the literature on neural correlates of specific emotions: each
one correlates with a set of regions, some of which are shared by multiple emotions
(Lindquist et al. 2012).More generally, distributed processing is gaining traction due to
the predictive success of the multivoxel pattern analysis techniques, whose underlying
assumption is that neural representations are codified by the activity of vast, sparse
networks of neurons.
(c)Degeneracy: one cognitive functionmight be implemented by different neural
underpinnings.
Another reasonwhy functionsmay fail tomap neatly onto a single neural structure is
that they are degenerate, i.e. that they can be realized by different neural underpinnings
(Noppeney et al. 2004). For instance, it has been argued that reading familiar words
might be processed either lexically (reading whole words) or phonologically (reading
letter-by-letter).7
While both distributed processing and degeneracy represent cases of many-to-one
function-structure relationships, in the former a single function maps onto a conjunc-
tion of structures, whereas in the latter it maps onto their disjunction. It is also worth
noting that these three issues are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they intersect
with one another, thereby casting multiple shadows upon FS.
However, (a—c) do not necessarily falsify FS. Indeed, far from being a purely
empirical claim about the brain, FS is best understood as a working hypothesis, a bet
whose heuristic power guides the development of an integrated cognitive ontology
(McCauley and Bechtel 2001). The history of psychology shows that the operations
of the mind can be variously described, and multiple hypotheses exist as to how these
operations can be decomposed. Moreover, although less obvious, there are several
ways to partition brain structures. All things considered, in a case of putative falsi-
fication of FS given a certain set of mental and neural categories, a researcher has
the option of preserving FS, and rather dispense with some of the mental or neural
categories that fail to map onto each other, in favor of more brain-friendly mental
categories and/or more mind-friendly neural categories.
Such an ontological refurnishing promises a huge payoff: namely, the possibility
of predicting a function straight out of a structure’s activation, and vice versa. The
degree of success of this search for predictive power “can be embodied operationally
in a cost function that reflects the prediction error in going from function to structure
and back again” (Price and Friston 2005: p. 272).
For instance, some of the threats posed by (a—c) might be addressed renegoti-
ating the neural ontology. To begin with, a putative multifunctional structure may
sometimes be subdivided in smaller structures, each with different functions. So,
for instance, the seemingly multifunctional insula turns out to be decomposable into
four distinct sub-regions, each one with more specific functions (Uddin et al. 2017:
p. 301; McCaffrey 2015). Also, Broca’s Area has been reconceptualized as consisting
in two structures: “one frontotemporal language-selective network and a second that
7 One might object that what Noppeney and colleagues describe as a single function (reading) with many
neural underpinnings is more naturally characterized as two distinct functions (phonological reading and




belongs to the domain-general frontoparietal [multiple-demand] network” (Fedorenko
and Blank 2020: p. 270), whose distinction was largely overlooked in group studies
due to their anatomical proximity (Z. Ward 2019).
Reforms of the neural ontology can also go the other way, i.e. clustering structures.
Indeed, in recent times, to address the fact that virtually every function correlates with
the activity of multiple and scattered brain areas, the focus of neural ontology pro-
gressively shifted from regions to networks, where ‘network’ is often simply regarded
as a set of brain areas (Klein 2012). More recently, De Brigard (2017) suggested
that topological properties—as opposed to localization—are the relevant properties
to individuate structures (and to link them to functions). However, for the purpose of
this paper, we are mainly interested in a strategy to reform of cognitive ontology, that
I discuss in the next sub-section.
3.2 Functional Abstraction and Neural Reuse
How to characterize the function of a neural structure has been a hot topic in many
philosophical and scientific discussions. In many contexts (e.g. Sterelny 1990; Price
and Friston 2005; Bergeron 2007; Klein 2012; Rathkopf (2013), forthcoming; Burn-
ston 2016a, b; Genon et al. 2018; Barack 2019; see Fig. 2), a distinction has been
proposed between (a) functional labels that are closer to folk psychological terms,
that represent a specific kind of psychological information, or that are task/domain-
bounded, and transparent with regard to the behavioral outcome, e.g. “reading”; and
(b) domain-neutral functional labels indicating the operation/computation a neural
structure performs, irrespectively of the outcome it subserves, e.g. “normalization”
(Carandini and Heeger 2012). Despite their similarities, most notions introduced to
account for the multi-layered nature of functional ascriptions carry some theoretical
baggage with themselves, which makes them not perfectly overlapping. Thus, to avoid
committing to any theory-laden lexicon, in the remainder of the paper I will employ
the rather uncommitted notions ‘surface-functions’ and ‘deep-functions’ to refer to (a)
and (b), respectively. The deliberate vagueness of these terms is meant to capture the
heterogeneity of functional ascriptions among cognitive neuroscientists and philoso-
phers. They are relational, contrastive terms, i.e. it only makes sense to speak of a
surface-functions in opposition to a deep(er)-function.
However interpreted, the distinction between surface-functions and deep-functions
comes in handy for defenders of FS: confronted with evidence that a given struc-
ture gets activated across different functions, they often admit that multifunctionality
obtains at the level of surface-functions, only to withdraw into defending FS at the
level of deep-functions. In Burnston’s (2016a) terms, they retreat from traditional
absolutism to computational absolutism. The rationale of this strategy, which I dub
functional abstraction, is expressed by Price and Friston: “structure–function rela-
tionships can be described at multiple levels […] Each level may be appropriate in
a different context […] but it is more useful to label a region with a function that
explains all patterns of activation” (2005: p. 268). Thus, they suggest that the surface-
multifunctionality of the left posterior lateral fusiform are but various manifestations
of deep-monofunctionality, i.e. sensorimotor integration. Similarly, in the face of the
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Fig. 2 A visual array of the lexicon employed by various scholars to characterize the distinction between
‘surface-functions’ and ‘deep-functions’. Notice that, as this comparison abstracts away from many theo-
retical details, terms of each columns are not perfectly synonymous
surface-multifunctionality of Broca’s Area, Tettamanti and Weniger (2006) propose a
single underlying deep-function, i.e. hierarchical processing. The reader might recall
that a similar strategy was invoked by the proponents of meta-modal hypothesis at the
beginning of this paper (§1).
The distinction between surface-functions and deep-function also allows preserving
FS in the light of degeneracy. In the dual mode of reading example from the previous
subsection, a broadly defined surface-function such as reading is exploited by means
of two distinct (sets of) deep-functions, each one associated with its neural machinery
(Figdor 2010; Polger and Shapiro 2016).
The pervasiveness of surface-multifunctionality (nicely documented by Anderson
et al. 2013) is predicted by, and in fact inspired, several theories that fall under the
umbrella-term neural reuse (Anderson 2010). Neural reuse boils down to the claim that
complex behaviors do not hinge uponmodules sculpted by evolution, but rather emerge
by repurposing the same old neural structures into playing new roles by gathering into
different functional allegiances (Anderson 2014).
Noticeably, while Anderson used to present neural reuse in terms of surface-
multifunctional structures that nonetheless may preserve the same deep-function,8
he later becomes skeptic that FS can be preserved even at the level of deep-function
(Anderson 2014; for a discussion see Zerilli 2019). In his most recent views, not even
the deep-functions of a neural entity are strictly predetermined: the fact that some neu-
ral structures tend to play the same (either deep and surface-)functional roles across
8 For instance, in (Anderson 2010) he borrows the distinction between cognitive workings and cognitive
roles fromBergeron (2007).Notice further that,while reuse of a samedeep-functionmaynicely explain some
instances of surface-multifunctionality, in other cases that are best kept separate surface-multifunctionality
may be due to a same structures performing different deep-functions (Barack 2019; McCaffrey 2015). Still
other putative cases of multifunctionality can be artifact due to failures in recognizing distinct structures, as




individuals depend upon their functional biases—a weaker, dispositional counter-
part of FS,—which may nonetheless end up being differently exploited depending on
ontogeny. In a similar vein, the current neuroscience literature increasingly recognizes
that the etiology of cortical functions depends upon an interplay of intrinsic facts per-
taining cytoarchitectonic and connectivity and the experiences that sculpt its plasticity
(see for instance Spunt and Adolphs 2017; de Beeck, Pillet and Ritchie 2019).
3.3 Contextualism
By shifting the focus from surface-functions to deep-functions, i.e. analyzing the inner
workings of some neural structures irrespectively of the behavior they contribute to,
the functional import of their structural properties is likely to become more trans-
parent—eventually to the point that we may bridge the mind-brain gap and predict
functions out of structures, as was hoped by Price and Friston (2005; cfr. Rathkopf
2013). However, a perfect knowledge of deep-functions will not suffice for cognitive
neuroscience.
To see why, recall Price and Friston’s functional abstraction upon the left posterior
lateral fusiform: the three surface-functions whose involvement they report (percep-
tion of words, of animal parts, and tactile-visual interface) are subsumed under the
deep-functional label “sensorimotor integration”. However, such an abstract func-
tional description is hardly specific to a given structure: apart from those neural regions
most proximal to sensory receptors or motor effectors, such a description applies to the
whole cortex. And even if from the activity of left posterior lateral fusiformwewere to
infer that some sensorimotor integration is occurring, this will leave us clueless about
what this mean at the level of behavior: is the subject reading words? Or is she at the
zoo, focusing on some animal parts? Or perhaps she is engaged in some new tasks we
did not expect? We cannot tell (for an extensive discussion, see Klein 2012; Burnston
2016a,b). While brain anatomy and physiology may also be interesting regardless
of their contribution to the behavior (Haueis 2014), cognitive neuroscience seeks to
establish how they contribute to behavior. Deep-functions alone are not enough to
predict behavior: surface-functions are also in order. We need them for planning and
interpreting experiments, which are often made of tasks; and, a fortiori, to understand
the import of cognitive neuroscience in everyday life.9
So, rather than aiming for deep-function labels that accounts for the activation of
some structure across different contexts, several scholars argued for context-sensitive
function-structure mappings.
Contextualism has been first introduced in philosophical debates by Klein (2012),
though its rationale has been defined and defended at length by Burnston (2016b).
Roughly speaking, contextualism boils down to a simple recipe: whenever one vari-
able, i.e. a given function or structure, is not enough to predict the other, further
variable(s) can be added, i.e. context(s) (Fig. 3).
9 This does not imply that the ontology of surface-functions needs be constrained by folk ontology: they
have different scopes (Dewhurst 2020). More likely, translations should be established between scientific
and folk ontologies (Francken and Slors 2017).
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Fig. 3 Contextualism allows us to disambiguate many-to-many (surface-)function-structure mappings by
reducing them to one-to-one mappings indexed to a specific context
According to Burnston (2016a), computational absolutism (i.e., the quest for estab-
lishing a single deep-function for eachbrain area) owes its charm to ambitious promises
of generalizability and projectability. Supported by a thorough discussion of the
context-dependent sensitivity of the MT area (which responds either to motion, depth,
or both, according to the availability of the stimuli), Burnston (2016a,b) argues that
such promises are empty. While absolutists regard the ascription of an open-ended
conjunction of possible (surface-)functions to an area as a bug, Burnston suggests
embracing it as a feature of the mapping endeavor. In the framework that he sketches,
known functional ascriptions are still generalizable in the sense that they guide the gen-
eration of hypotheses about unknown functions. But “the level of generality of each of
the conjuncts in the theory is precisely a matter for empirical investigation—discover-
ing the limits of generalizability for a certain conjunct is just as important an advance
as discovering that it holds in many instances” (Burnston 2016b: pp. 546–547).
A few notions of context have been proposed in the philosophical literature. To
assess their usefulness, at least in principle, one may adapt a revised version of the
criterion put forward by Price and Friston (2005: p. 272):
that function should be predicted from anatomical activation and conversely that
anatomical activation should predict [surface-]function [given a certain context]. This
can be embodied operationally in a cost function that reflects the prediction error in
going from [surface-]function [plus context] to structure and back again.
Building on the works of McIntosh (2004), Klein introduced the notion of neural
context, defined as “the overall network in which a region is participating” (2012:
p. 957). As a matter of fact, an area can be activated while performing various sorts
of tasks, to the point that the ongoing task is not predictable upon the observation of
the area’s activity in isolation. Yet, the relevant area is accompanied by different sets
of areas in different cases. Actually, even the very same set of areas may implement
different surface-functions, due to changes in connection strength between regions,
or due to their fine-grained temporal sequence of activation, which is unlikely to be
revealed by fMRI scans alone (Pessoa 2014). In a similar spirit, Viola and Zanin
(2017) proposed that some physiological features of neural structures’ activity, such
as their oscillatory frequency, may help discriminate their current (surface-, but pos-
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sibly even deep-)function. This idea is further developed by Burnston (2019: p. 12),
who painstakingly describes how “physiological activity within a given brain unit—-
cell, population of cells, or brain area—is not dependent solely on its inputs, but is
modulated by background variables” such as the Local Field Potential.
Khalidi (2017) argued that function-structure relationships should also consider
non-neural variables concerning the environmental-etiological context. His strategy
would allow us to preserve some folk psychological distinctions even when they do
not map neatly onto dedicated neural substrates. For instance, given the striking sim-
ilarity in terms of neural activity between remembering the past and imagining it
(or the future), a conflation between memory and imagination has been proposed.
However, doing so would prevent us from distinguishing correct memories and incor-
rect ones (as you cannot misimagine something). To avoid this issue, Khalidi claims
that knowledge of distal etiological context must come into play when individuating
(surface-)functions. Namely, when the recalled trace and some actual mental repre-
sentation held in the subject’s past are congruent, we speak of memory. Otherwise we
speak of imagination.
3.4 Population as a context for function-structure mapping
In the light of the discussion of the previous sub-section, I can now state my theo-
retical commitments with the regard to the debate on function-structure mapping. In
general, I endorse contextualism: I do not think that cognitive neuroscience should
(nor could) do without surface-functions. Quite on the contrary, I think that cognitive
neuroscientists should mainly care about the surface-functional properties of neural
structures. However, I also think that the notion of deep-function has some merits,
with the caveat that it should not be pursued as a “ultimate functional description” of
a given neural structure, but more deflationary as a heuristic device to unravel new
surface-functions. Conversely, discovering new surface-functionsmay lead to revision
in deep-functional ascriptions (see §5.1).
That being said,while all the notions of context presented in the previous sub-section
may prove useful to bridge structures and surface-function despite multifunctionality
and degeneracy, none of them address the very challenge I am addressing in this
paper: namely, that different neural structures can play different surface-functions
(e.g. processing visual information or subserving echo-location) in some individuals,
but not in others.
Previously, individual differences in function-structure mapping were invoked to
justify skepticism about the very idea of cognitive neuroscience. For instance, inspired
by Karl Lashley’s seminal work on cortical plasticity, Jerry Fodor remarkably claimed
that “is entirely possible that the nervous system of higher organisms characteristically
achieves a given psychological end by a wide variety of neurological means. If so, then
the attempt to pair neurological structureswith psychological functions is foredoomed”
(1974: p. 105).
However,paceFodor, rejecting the (quasi-)universal ambitions of thePlatonicBrain
Model does not foredoom neuroscience to turn into a mere collection of idiosyncratic
token-correspondences about the brain and mind of single individuals, blocking any
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possible generalizations. Patterned function-structure mappings can provide a middle-
groundbetween thePlatonicBrainModel andFodor’saporia. Similarly toKim (1992),
who proposed to split “jades” into two categories “jadeite” and “nephrite”, I suggest
sorting individuals into distinct neuroscientifically relevant populations based on some
factors that drive them to share a same functional organization. To be fair with Cara-
mazza, he himself envisaged the possibility “to scientifically investigate some domain
of natural phenomena where we could not make the assumption of universality (e.g., if
there were several kinds of human minds)” (1986: 49, fn. 3). However, unlike jadeite
and nephrite, human brains cannot be sorted out into natural kinds based on a single,
underlying essence. Quite on the contrary, membership to some population is due to
the joint work of several factors steering functional organization. As such, the same
individual may belong to several populations at once, and its membership can be
altered in time (see below in §5.2).
Before proposing some criteria for sorting subjects into populations, in order to
stress why this proposal is in order, in the next section (§4) I discuss the case of the
so-called “Fusiform Face Area”.
4 The fusiform face (or flexible?) area
4.1 A dedicatedmodule for face perception
Going somehow against the tide of contemporary emphasis on distributed process-
ing (e.g. Pessoa 2014), Nancy Kanwisher (e.g. 2010, 2017) strenuously defends the
existence of cortices functionally specialized for some category of stimuli. Among
them, the most notable is the so-called Fusiform Face Area: a portion of the right
fusiform gyrus (in temporal lobe) specialized in processing faces so to determine their
identities.
The hypothesis that a dedicated cognitive system exists for recognizing faces (but
not other objects) circulated in psychology way before neuroscience kicked in. Early
findings showed that presenting a stimulus upside-down impairs the recognition of
faces far more than other objects (Yin 1969). At the same time, the identity of two jux-
taposed half-faces is harder to recognize when the two halves are matched than when
they are misaligned. Interestingly, the recognition of the two halves is better when
these composite faces are presented upside-down (Young, Hellawell and Hey 1987).
Bodamer (1947) reported a specific syndrome in which face perception is selectively
impaired, dubbing it prosopagnosia. In the following decades, double dissociations
have been reported between (rare) patients who suffer only from impairment in face
recognition (e.g. Rossion et al. 2003; Riddoch et al. 2008) and patients with pre-
served face recognition, who are nonetheless impaired with other objects (Rumiati
and Humphreys 1997). However, prosopagnosic subjects present the same recogni-
tion accuracy when faces are presented upright or upside-down (Busigny and Rossion
2010). These and other findings support the idea that, in most cases, face recognition
is based on holistic processing, i.e., on the relative positions of the elements of a face
rather than on the detailed analysis of specific facial details.
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Enter neuroscience. Inspired by evidence of a specific module for face processing,
some laboratories undertook the quest for localizing it. The most notable result was
achieved by Kanwisher and colleagues (1997). With a fMRI study, they found that a
portion of the occipitotemporal cortex, in the right fusiform gyrus, was consistently
more responsive to stimuli depicting faces than other objects—including scrambled
faces.10 Kanwisher’s team thus claimed that that area, which they dubbed FFA, is
selective for processing faces. More specifically, for holistic processing of faces, as
suggested by lesser activation with scrambled face.
Their hypothesis was supported by other evidence. For instance, FFA’s activation
in subjects suffering from prosopagnosia differ from that of controls (e.g. Hadjikhani
and de Gelder 2002). And acquired prosopagnosia often depend upon lesions in the
FFA. Yet, in some patients FFA is spared, and the lesion is instead located in the left
frontal cortex (Cohen et al. 2019). Does this speak against the one-to-one mapping
between face processing and FFA?
4.2 Is face processing distributed?
Contrary toKanwisher, some scholars held that face processing should not be narrowly
localized, as it rather depends on a distributed processing of several neural structures
spread across the ventral temporal cortex. In what became the proof of concept for
MultiVariate PatternAnalysis, Haxby and colleagues (2001) exposed subjects to visual
stimuli from six categories (including faces) during an fMRI scan. Based on a wide,
non-localized activation pattern corresponding to each category from half of their
dataset, they predicted the category of the stimulus of the unlabeled activations for
the other half of the dataset with astonishing accuracy (>90%). Crucially, when the
prediction was repeated leaving out the voxels that were maximally responsive to each
category, accuracy dropped only very slightly. The following moral was drawn: the
representation of object categories (including faces) depends on a widespread coding
and not on the activity of a small area.
While Kanwisher grants that face recognition, like any cognitive task, may depend
upon the joint activation of several areas, she also vindicates FFA’s centrality by
employing a “correlation is not causation” argument. In fact, since BOLD fMRI only
provides indirect measures of brain activity, the signal employed by researchers (or by
classifiers) to infer mental states from neural activations is not necessarily the same
signal playing a causal role in the neural implementation of that mental state (Ritchie
et al. 2019). Her argument is further supported by the finding that, through direct
cortical stimulation of FFA, a neurosurgical patient reported seeing illusory faces on
top of ordinary objects (Schalk et al. 2017).
In the next subsection, I examine some evidence showing that FFA has multiple
functions in different subjects. Beside highlighting the need for a population-based
10 A further aspect that makes FFA an interesting case study for individual differences pertains its local-
ization. In fact, despite being consistently involved in face processing across subjects, its precision location
within the fusiform gyrus cannot be determined by purely anatomical means. To circumvent this misalign-
ment, Kanwisher advocates the use of functional localizers, i.e. determining the localization of a region




contextualism (§5.1), this discussionwill also suggest some criteria for sorting subjects
into populations (§5.2).
4.3 A Fusiform“Flexible” Area?
While not denying that FFA is crucial for face recognition, the advocates of the
so-called expertise hypothesis argue that this functional description is but the tip—how-
ever big—of an iceberg. In my lexicon, the hypothesis claims that FFA has a
deep-function that is holistic processing of familiar stimuli. This deep-function is
typically put at the service of face recognition because faces are a kind of stimulus
with which most human beings are familiar. Still, the same deep-function could be
recruited for other surface-functions. Hence, they propose to preserve the acronym
“FFA”, but to reinterpret it as “Fusiform FlexibleArea” (Tarr and Gauthier 2000). The
higher levels of accuracy registered in recognizing faces from one’s own ethnicity and
age may lend further support to this hypothesis (Gross 2009), and so would the recent
claim that, after all, most people are good at recognizing only some faces – namely,
those they are familiar with (Young and Burton 2017).
During the last two decades, different research groups seeking confirmation for
the expertise hypothesis designed an experiment to demonstrate the involvement of
FFA for other stimuli domain. Gauthier and colleagues (1999) trained some subjects
to recognize some artificial objects called greebles. fMRI scans of both trained and
untrained participants during a greebles recognizing task revealed greater FFA activity
in the trained participants. Interestingly, this engagement vanishedwhen greebles were
presented upside down, similarly to what happens with faces. While greebles proved
to be scarcely significant due to their similarity to faces, other categories of stimuli
have also been reported to undergo a distinctive (holistic) processing style in experts
of some domain, yielding to more accurate and faster recognition, and to activate FFA.
These domains include cars and birds (Gauthier et al. 2000; Xu 2005); regular chess
games, but not isolated chess pieces (Bilalić et al. 2011); and radiological images
(Bilalić et al. 2014).
However suggestive, findings of the involvement of FFA in new surface-functions
does not establish that its putative FS for faces was just a matter of expertise. Further
support for this claim comes from Arcaro et al. (2017). In their study, some rhesus
monkeys were raised in a face-deprived environment since birth. After 2 months,
these monkeys did not exhibit the same face-centric gaze fixation patterns, nor the
same cortical activation patterns, of controls.
Yet, still other studies suggest that the special status of face, as well as it privileged
relation with FFA, may be at least partially independent from visual experience, and
instead depend upon the anatomy of FFA and top-down connections with cortices
implied in social cognition (Powell, Kosakowski and Saxe 2018; Kamps et al. 2020).11
11 For instance, Buiatti and colleagues (2019) employed specific EEG adapted for testing 1- to 4-days old
human newborns. They found increased activity in newborns’ temporooccipital cortex (their “proto-FFA”)
for upright face-like stimuli when compared to inverted or scrambled face-like stimuli. Moreover, van den
Hurk, Van Baelen and de Beeck (2017) report that either visual and auditory stimuli of “facial actions”
(e.g. kissing or whistling) activate similar areas in the ventral-temporal cortex (where the FFA stands) of
sighted individuals, and that auditory face stimuli result in bilateral fusiform activations in congenitally blind
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So, is the selectivity for face a surface-function that simply exploits FFA’s deep-
functional predisposition for holistic processing? Or perhaps faces are so tightly tied
to that spot of cortex that they themselves influence its deep-functional workings,
making it suitable for being reused in recognizing other stimuli such as chess games?
As the debate is ongoing, it is prudent to stay agnostic on this question. In either
case, it is undisputed that FFA is sometimes reused for processing objects other than
faces. But this reuse is conditional on learning. In other words: the FFA becomes a
surface-multifunctional area in some subjects with an expertise in certain domains,
while in others it seemingly remains surface-monofunctionally attuned to face. In the
next section, I will leverage on this observation to argue for a shift from a Platonic
function-structure mapping framework toward a population-bounded contextualism.
5 Beyond the Platonic Brain Model
5.1 The limits of the Platonic Brain Model
Recall: one aim of a Platonic neuroscience is that of finding “a normal (default)
function–structure mapping” (Henson 2005: p. 225) of the utmost generalizability.
Within that framework, it seems safe to claim that the FFA is functionally specialized
in processing faces. The fact that the FFA-face processingmapping could fail to obtain
in congenital prosopagnosic subject is not a nuisance for the Platonic Brain Model.
After all, themodel ismeant to generalize tohealthy adults, and prosopagnosic subjects
hardly count as such.
However, the Platonic Brain Model is committed to overlook the latent surface-
multifunctionality of FFA, as it only shows up in certain individuals, i.e. expert
perceivers of some category of objects like cars or radiological images.
A defender of the Platonic Brain Model may well respond that these are just idle
details about surface-functions, and rather settles for specifying the deep-function of
each neural structure. Thus, since neuroscientists indeed came up with a relatively
solid deep-functional characterization of FFA as an area involved in holistic shape
processing, why bother specifying to which domains this processing applies?
Now, while legitimate, such a reply comes with a non-negligible implication:
namely, that the Platonic Brain Model becomes rather uninformative of behavior.
As discussed in §3.3, deep-functions underdetermine behavior. Recall that according
to Price and Friston (2005: p. 272), the hallmark of a good ontology is that “function
should be predicted from anatomical activation and conversely that anatomical acti-
vation should predict function”. If we take “function” to include surface-function, we
can observe that, by knowing that someone’s FFA is getting relevantly activated, you
cannot infer whether she is just looking at some face or she is e.g. a veteran radiologist
trying to diagnose some lung infection. However, we have seen (in §3.3) that con-
textual information may ameliorate the lack of robustness of reverse inference from
Footnote 11 continued
individuals. In a recent preprint (Ratan Murty and colleagues manuscript), Kanwisher’s team describes an
experiment where they found that in congenitally blind subjects, a same area in the fusiform gyrus responds




structures to surface-functions. In this case, the relevant contextual information is the
expertise of the subject in some specific visual domains: by knowing that she is not
an expert radiologist, for instance, we may exclude that the activation of FFA in her
case underlies the observation of radiological images.
While knowing about a structure’s deep-functions is insufficient to predict its con-
tribution to behavior, deep-functional ascriptions can play an important heuristic role.
Indeed, when investigating FFA’s involvement in expert perception beyond faces, they
did expect a same deep-functional style of processing, that is, configural processing.
To verify this, they checked for inversion effects in the perception of greebles (Gauthier
et al. 1999) or radiological images (Bilalić et al. 2014). Based on such expectations
about the deep-function of FFA, future investigations about its possible redeployment
in recognizing objects fromother domainswill likely privilege classes of objectswhich
can be discriminated by their overall shape rather than classes of objects that can be
discriminated by paying attention on some details.
Conversely, knowledge of possible surface-functions may help to understand the
deep-functions an area may play. In localizing a portion of cortex selective for Poké-
mons across various former players, Gomez and colleagues (2019) were not merely
checking an oddity. Rather, they were wondering what deep-functional semantic prop-
erty best accounted for the surface-functional stimulus specificity that portion of cortex
could acquire: animacy, rectilinearity, real-world size, or eccentricity of the stimuli
(i.e. whether it is typically perceived in foveal or in peripheral vision). By comparing
subjects’ response to Pokémon characters with other classes of objects like faces, ani-
mals, body parts, and corridors, they argued in favor of eccentricity (but see de Beeck
et al. 2019: p. 794).
Other than across-subject (surface-)multifunctionality, the Platonic Brain Model
is poorly equipped to account for across-subject degeneracy. Some cognitive tasks,
especially those involving complexhigher-cognitive faculties, admitmultiple solutions
– that is, subjects can solve them by leveraging on alternative sets of deep-functions,
resulting in the involvement of different neural circuits. Miller and colleagues (2002)
report wide across-subject differences in patterns of fMRI activation of six subjects
performing a retrieval task. However, they also noted a good across-time stability
within the same individual—suggesting these idiosyncrasies should not be dismissed
as noise. Since these idiosyncratic activations might be overlooked by pooling the
activations of different subjects, they warn that “group analysis alone, particularly for
higher order cognitions like episodic retrieval, may be incomplete and, in some cases,
misleading” (Miller et al. 2002: 1211).
Accepting that individuals accomplish tasks in different ways does not imply that
no generalizability is possible. On the contrary, in a later study Miller and colleagues
(2012) try to interpret this variety of activations as differences in cognitive style
(i.e. whether people are mainly visualizers or verbalizers) and encoding strategies,
measured with some questionnaires. They found that both factors accounted for a
significant part of the variance in the similarity of brain activity between individu-
als. In a similar vein, Noppeney and colleagues (2006) had 17 subjects performing a
verbal decision task about some auditory stimulus (spoken word or sound), primed
by either congruent or incongruent visual stimuli (written word or picture). Besides
some regions commonly activated across all subjects, the experimenters were able
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to distinguish two subgroups, based on the set of further regions activated beside the
common ones. They speculate on the deep-functional meaning of different activations,
although unfortunately, unlike Miller and colleagues (2012), they did not verify them
with independent measures such as questionnaires.
5.2 Population of subjects as a context for function-structure mappings
According to Burnston, within a contextualist approach toward function-structure
mapping, “discovering the limits of generalizability for a certain conjunct is just
as important an advance as discovering that it holds in many instances” (Burnston
2016b: p. 547). Thus far, the allure of the Platonic Brain Model may have misled
neuroscientists. They could either have overlooked some aspects of some structure’s
deep-function or failed to appreciate some of their unusual surface-function. For
instance, the comparisons between sighted and blind subjects allowed to reveal supra-
modal deep-functions in areas traditionally (mis)conceived as merely visual, as well
as to reveal further surface-functions that they may acquire due to plastic reorganiza-
tion (Pascual-Leone and Hamilton 2001; Ricciardi and Pietrini 2011; Cecchetti et al.
2016; Bedny 2017). On the other hand, Simons, Shoda and Lindsay (2017) suggest
that to mitigate the dreaded replication crisis in psychological science, the section
“Constraints on generality” may be added in research papers. Here researchers should
answer questions concerning the generalizability they expect for their findings, includ-
ing: “to which populations do you expect those findings to apply?”
To answer this question, and more in general to develop a proper contextualist
function-structure mapping that still admits some generalizability, criteria shall be
found for sorting subjects in different populations. The carvings of such populations
are not self-evident. Rather, “the definition of a reference population is theory-laden”
(Caramazza 1986: p. 51). So, for instance, blind subjects may be a population if we
are studying vision, but other criteria will possibly drive population-clustering when
we turn to study for instance smell. Moreover, Hochstein (2016) reminds us that,
like the rest of science, the sciences of the mind have many purposes, and that the
best categorization of the mental depends on what purpose one is pursuing. The same
point holds for population-based contextualism about structure functionmappings. For
instance, neurosurgeons are happy to sacrifice generalizability for the sake of accuracy,
which is why before the surgical intervention they often directly assess causal role of
some specific spots of cortex is often assessed bymeans of direct electrical stimulation
(Duffau 2017). To them, the ideal population is composed by only one individual (at
a given time).
For researchers who want to retain some generality, developing an ontology of
neuroscientifically relevant populationswill require a significant amount of conceptual
and empirical effort. Factors predictive of a certain functional organization of the
brain must be predicted, and their boundaries and mutual interactions scrutinized,
in the light of certain aims and questions. Subjects will simultaneously belong to
multiple populations, and each of these memberships is likely of interest only a few
function-structure mappings. To complicate things, we have reason to expect that
these memberships will interact non-linearly, as surface-functions often compete for
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neural real estate: developmental studies show that the FFA’s preference for face is
lateralized in the right hemisphere after that, and possibly because of , the ipsilateral
region establish its preference forwords (Dundas, Plaut andBehrmann2013;Dehaene-
Lambertz, Monzalvo and Dehaene 2018).
That being said, I can sketch with broad stokes the contour of at least one kind of
population, for which I propose the following working definition:
[Expertise-based Population] Structure S playing the deep-function F is recruited
for some processing related to the surface-functional domain D in F-way if and
only if a subject is an expert in D.
This definition captures the empirical insight that, in some cases, prolonged experi-
ence with some kinds of stimuli or cognitive activities does not only yield quantitative
changes in brain anatomy (as inMaguire et al. 2000). Rather, when the relevant amount
of expertise is achieved, expert performance may differ not only quantitatively, e.g.
because it engages neural structure more or less intensively (which can be easily
accounted for by the Platonic Brain Model), but also qualitatively. When this is the
case, a same taskmay recruit different deep-functions and hence different neural struc-
tures (Roepstorff, Niewöhner, and Beck 2010; Guida et al. 2012; Bilalić 2017). The
transition between non-experts and expert may occur smoothly, and sharp boundaries
may thus be hard to establish (Buckner 2016). But just like vague boundaries between
brain areas do not discourage scientists from speaking about brain areas (Haueis 2012),
neither should vague boundaries between experts and non-experts in a certain domain
discourage them to speak about expert populations.
Being an expert in the respective domains makes the difference for the FFA’s
involvement in holistic perception of objects like greebles, chess games, and radi-
ological images. Moreover, if the expertise hypothesis is correct, expertise is also at
the root of FFA’s surface-functional specialization in face recognition. The same logic
applies equally well for other cases such as echolocators and literate subjects: it is
only thanks to the acquaintance with written letters that the left fusiform gyrus of lit-
erate subjects acquires the surface-function of reading. Moreover, a sufficiently liberal
notion of ‘expertise’ can also account for the difference between the functional voca-
tion of the (Platonically speaking) “visual” areas in sighted as opposed to non-sighted
subjects the former being conceived as ‘experts’ in the (broad) domain of vision.
Other kinds of populations may be individuated based on demographic (e.g.
socio-economic status, ethnicity or gender) or clinical factors (e.g. suffering from
a psychopathological disease).
Admittedly, “demographical factors” include disparate things, fromSocioeconomic
Status (SES) to sex. A review of the neural correlates of SES (Farah 2017) shows that,
on the one hand, patterned differences can be found in the neural activity underlying
certain tasks based on the subjects’ SES, which are not only quantitative but also
qualitative. However, on the other hand, Farah highlights that, despite being a proxy
measure for predicting these differences, SES per se is not necessarily producing them.
On the contrary, SES is a composite index that collapses many factors like stress and
literacy, whose causal relationships with brain organization can follow multiple paths.
Indirect measures such as SES can be at best proxies toward the causally relevant
factors driving brain organization. In otherwords, it is likely that, at least in some cases,
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function-structuremappingswith a nice correlationwith somedemographic factor turn
out to correlate even better with some underlying factors that can be accounted in term
of expertise.12
One may think that this line of cautionary reasoning applies to certain factors, like
SES, but not to others, like sex. After all, unlike SES, an eminently social phenomenon,
sex is rooted in biology. Thus, we can perhaps hope to distinguish “the female brain”
and “themale brain”. This line of reasoning, however, fails to appreciate that belonging
to a particular sex (and gender) has several consequences that span throughout the life
history of an individual, and that are highly dependent on cultural factors. In simple
terms, in virtually every society of human history, being born female or male makes
it much more likely to routinely perform some activities rather than others. Thus,
even if differences that are driven on genetic or hormonal bases exist, they are so
tightly intertwined with culturally based learning-driven factors that distinguishing
them is not straightforward (Joran-Young and Rumiati 2012; Joel et al. 2015; but cf.
Del Giudice 2019).
Finally, seen in the light of population contextualism, many clinical uses of func-
tional neuroimaging are seen as inferences from structure plus function to a certain
clinical population. Similarly to the Platonic Brain Model strategy to zero-out the
contextual variable of population by checking only “normal subjects”, many clinical
studies aim at zeroing-out the possible confounds of an externally-driven function by
using a resting state design (e.g. van den Heuvel et al. 2013). Defining and diagnosing
psychopathological and neurological disorders presents several challenges (e.g., recall
Caramazza’s concern about etiology- versus symptom-based grouping), and relevant
ethical implications, that cannot be addressed in this paper. However, abandoning the
Platonic Brain Model may set the stage for a more fruitful discussion. To mention but
one example, think of the recent claims that, at least in some cases, Asperger Syndrome
is not a syndrome at all, it is just neurodiversity—not differently from other cases of
biological dimorphism (for a discussion, see Jaarsma and Welin 2012). Whatever one
think about this claim, approaching it from a post-platonic framework will probably
help to take this claim with the seriousness that it deserves, because such a framework
does not prescribe a monolithic normativity about the brain.
6 Conclusion: sketching the agenda for a post-Platonic neuroscience
In this paper, I have urged to take into account inter-individual variability in cognitive
skills and brain organization as a possible source of qualitative diversity in function-
structuremappings. I have a described a popular strategy for addressing this variability:
excluding abnormal subjects, and take the (averaged) results of normal subjects as
informative about “the Platonic Brain Model”, from which inferences can be drawn
about any normal brain. Building on the discussion surrounding the functional role(s)
of the FFA, I showed how failure to relativize functional ascriptions to specific popu-
lations may result in overlooking surface-multifunctionality (and degeneracy). I thus
12 Despite being useful in flagging the problem, the label “WEIRD” (Henrich et al. 2010) is too large
a category to drive population grouping within the contextualist framework I am advocating (see also
Roepstorff et al. 2010).
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invoked the necessity to develop an ontology of neuroscientifically relevant notions
of populations. Finally, I suggested one promising (albeit not exhaustive) criterion for
sorting population, namely expertise-based population.
My plea goes on a par with those coming from an increasing number of researchers
who invite to treat inter-subject diversity as signal, not as noise (e.g. Falk et al. 2013;
Thiebault de Schotten and Shallice 2017; Seghier and Price 2018; Clark Barrett 2020).
The Platonic BrainModel has served us quite well in many cases, providing a baseline
for many claims about brain organization. But as cognitive neuroscience is evolving
into a mature science, replacing it with the more context-sensitive framework of a
post-platonic neuroscience would repay in terms of accuracy in predicting behavior.
Moreover, on the grounds of philosophical anthropology, itwould allowus to break free
from the tethers of a concept of human nature largely predetermined by evolution (see
also Rathkopf forthcoming), and to widen the scope of neuroscience from traditional
behaviors toward peculiar ones. The time is ripe to look beyond what the ideal brain
typically does, toward what real brains can do in their beautiful diversity.
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